Correspondence.

• Author: White, Robert
• Position: Letter to the editor

Sir,

For someone long interested in the development and workings of our nuclear free legislation, the appearance of Gerald Hensley's recent book Friendly Fire, Nuclear Politics and the Collapse of NZUS, 1984-987 promised an interesting read, particularly considering positive reviews of it that have appeared, including that by Roger Dingman in your November-December 2013 issue (vol 38, no 6), and as it is described on the back cover as the 'definitive account' of a key turning point in New Zealand history.

Unfortunately, a careful reading of Hensley's book reveals it to be a history marred by mistakes ranging from minor to very serious, misquotation and misrepresentation of documents, and subtle displays of his extreme dislike of the legislation and everything associated with it. As Sir Geoffrey Palmer remarked recently, Hensley never liked the policy and still does not. For brevity, only a few major points of concern are considered.

Despite Hensleys statement in his Preface that 'accuracy is critical when history is still being argued over', mistakes soon appear. As early as page 6, Hensley claims that 'in 1969 the Holyoake Government had banned such visits [by nuclear powered vessels] pending US acceptance of absolute liability in the case of an accident.' This is incorrect. There was no ban, even under the 1972-75 Labour government.

In August 1971 the British were enquiring about the possibility of visits by their nuclear-powered submarines, and in December that year the United States lodged a formal request for a visit by the nuclear-powered submarine USS Scamp early in 1972. However, by this time our government, like other governments, had become concerned about the safety of naval nuclear reactors and had laid down certain requirements for any such visit relating to the state of the reactors during the visit. This required the provision of technical information relating to the reactors that the United States never releases. The government to which the ship belonged was also required to accept absolute and unlimited liability for any damage from any nuclear incident during the visit, something the United States would not accept at that time. The visit did not proceed.

Official reactions to the problem of the safety of naval nuclear reactors in this period is covered in detail by Malcolm Templeton in chapter 9 of his excellent 2006 book Standing Upright Here, New Zealand in the Nuclear Age 1945-1990, and in my 1997 Working Paper No 7...