Critique of Hart's Concept of Law in Samoa

• Date: 01 January 2024

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CRITIQUE OF HART’S CONCEPT OF

LAW IN SAMOA

Bridget Fa’amatuainu*

Abstract

Hart’s “Concept of Law” has gaine d widespread recognitio n in legal philosophy

by pro posing that a legal system is best understood as a com bination of primary rules

that imp ose obligations and second ary rules that grant the authority to create, modify,

and interpret those primary rules. One aspect in Hart’s concept concerns the prelegal

or prim itive system, consisting of a society g overned solely by primary rules of con duct

without seco ndary rules. us, it proceeds to assert that such a system exists in a sma ll,

stable communi ty bound by shared beliefs an d kinship. is article illustrates tha t

upon c loser scrutiny within l egally intricat e and bi jural contexts – such as the case of

Samoa, where both primary and secondary rules co-exi st – the argument p roves to be

fundamentally awed. Moreover, this critique highlights the limitations in the standard

application of Hart’s Concept of Law in other post-colonial contexts, including Aotearoa

New Zealand and South Africa. e article fur ther argues that more critical and nuanced

perspectives are needed to examine the l egal reality of Hart’s theo ry in modern post-

colonial contexts.

I. Introduction

HLA Har t’s contribut ions to juris prudence are foundat ional, par ticula rly in

disti nguish ing law from mora lity and pr oviding a fr amework for underst anding

legal systems.1 Har t critiqued ea rlier positiv ist theories , notably John Aus tin’s

“command theory of law”, which red uced law to commands issued by a sovereign,

enforced by sanc tions.2 While inuentia l, Au stin’s t heory over simplified law and

failed t o address the complex ities of modern govern ance. Har t responded by

introduci ng a mor e so phisticated model, di erentiating bet ween primary ru les

(governi ng conduct) and second ary ru les (regulat ing how prima ry rules a re

recognised, amended and adjudicated).

1 Herbert L A Hart, e Co ncept of Law (2nd ed, Ox ford Universit y Press, Oxfor d, 1994) at 92.

2 Collin Tapper “Austin on Sanc tions” (1965) 23(2) Cambr idge Law Journa l 271–287; and Hart , above

n 1, at 116.

* Law Lecturer, Scho ol of Law, Auckland Un iversity of Tech nology.

68 [Vol 31, 2024]

Argu ably, Hart’s concept of second ary rule s marked a pivota l advancement in

legal ph ilosophy. Hart ident ied three key secondary rules: the r ule of recogn ition

(determin ing the validi ty of legal rules), the r ule of change (outli ning how laws are

amended or int roduced), and the r ule of adjudicat ion (providin g mechanis ms for

resolvin g disputes). These se condary ru les are essenti al for understa nding lega l

systems a s exible and inst itutional fr ameworks, not just coerci ve structure s.

Note that Ha rt’s model in non-Western leg al system s presents chal lenges.

Samoa’s legal s ystem, for ex ample, int egrates fa’asamoa (customa ry law) wi th a forma l

system ba sed on British com mon law, creating a plu ralist ic legal envi ronment.3

While pri mary and se condary ru les exist, they do not a lign neat ly with Har t’s model

when exami ned in legally plu ralistic cu stomary conte xts.

This ar ticle exami nes Hart’s the ory in the conte xt of Samoa’s legal s ystem,

focusing on t he three second ary rule s and their operat ion in a legal ly plurali stic

environm ent. It will h ighlig ht the limit ations of Har t’s model when applied to

non-Western contex ts. Compari sons with pos t-colonial soc ieties of Aotear oa New

Zeala nd and South A frica oers a broade r socio-legal per spective on th e challenges

of applying West ern legal theor ies to diverse cult ural setti ngs.

II. Samoan Legal System

Before I expand on the “standa rd” theoretical approach in which Ha rt’s concepts

operate, it is ne cessary to be gin each section of t his art icle with a brief dis cussion of

Samoa’s position , at customary a nd state level.

A. Fa’asamoa in Pre-Colonial Samoa

Prior to colon isation in the lat e 19th century, Sa moa was governed by fa’asamoa

(the Samoa n way of life), a custom ary lega l system that s tructu red all asp ects of

3 Interview wit h Nanai Agaia va (6 May 2009) in Marga ret Smith “Samoa nizing” Hum an Rights: A

Gener ational Comparat ive of Vie ws on Human Rights in C ontempo rary Sam oa” (Independent Study

Project (I SP) Collection 635, 200 9); Interview wit h Asofou So’o (27 May 2009) in Smit h, above;

and Un asa Va’a “ Samoan Custom and Huma n Rig hts: An Indigen ous View” (2009) 40 Victo ria

Universit y of Wellington Law R eview 237, at 237–25 0 for a more comprehensi ve discussion of

fa’asamoa values in the conte xt of custom a nd human rig hts.