Moscow legation: no piano! Ken Ross discusses the early days of New Zealand's diplomatic representation in Russia.

AuthorRoss, Ken

In the annals of New Zealand diplomacy New Zealand's first-ever 'hardship' post, the legation in Moscow (1944-50), remains unrivalled as the most extraordinary venture in representation by New Zealand as an independent nation. Half-a-dozen New Zealanders inexperienced in diplomacy and poorly equipped for a hostile environment were dispatched to Moscow in the second half of 1944 to represent New Zealand. Never again have New Zealand diplomats gone into diplomacy with such an inexperienced team for such an exotic experience.

I am somewhat ashamed of the fact that in our Legation we have no piano; in fact, we are the only Legation in Moscow without one. (Charles Boswell, 1947) (1)

New Zealand's first-ever hardship post was the legation opened in Moscow in 1944--it remains unrivalled in the annals of our diplomacy as the most extraordinary venture in representation of New Zealand as an independent nation. The legation lasted six years: new prime minister Sid Holland closed it in June 1950. Its life and times has generated an array of perspectives, including from Gerald Hensley, Malcolm Templeton, James McNeish and Joanna Woods. (2) Many of their insights are newly contestable with access now possible to the diaries of Charles Boswell, Peter Fraser's erstwhile undistinguished parliamentary colleague, who Fraser chose to head the legation. (3) His three diaries not only give new life to an enduring puzzle--why Fraser chose Boswell--they exemplify in much detail the desultory life Boswell and his wife Jean had there. Boswell wails a litany of woes about Wellington's perceived lack of interest in their comforts, including that they had no piano.

In early 1944 Alister Mcintosh had been charged by Fraser to open a legation in Moscow. On appointment as head of the new External Affairs department in June 1943, Mcintosh had taken responsibility for diplomatic missions in London, Canberra, Ottawa and Washington: they were to prompt little stress for him in his early years.

Mcintosh was disappointed when the legation closed: by then it was 'beginning to pay a useful dividend'--high praise coming from him. (4) He had stressed to Boswell in 1947 the legation's value as 'a necessary manifestation of New Zealand's international status, and it is almost unthinkable that once having instituted it ' we can close the Legation down'. (5)

The Moscow experiment had another bene fit--it developed Mcintosh's leadership: never again did he allow a 'parachutist'--a political appointee as ambassador or high commissioner--to test him as had Boswell. (6) Of the 18 'parachutists' that Mcintosh was dealt by the four prime ministers he serviced, even though several were miserable sods, none of the others came close to Boswell for such an abject performance as he gave in Moscow heading the legation from July 1944 until his recall in July 1949. (7) Even so, a month after reaching Moscow, Boswell pitched to the prime minister that the legation must be upgraded to an embassy: he reported he had already experienced demeaning treatment from the Soviet regime and similarly so from other diplomatic missions because New Zealand had opted for a legation rather than an embassy (he wanted ambassadorial privileges not granted to him as minister at the legation). (8)

The Moscow experiment saw Mcintosh emerge at the forefront of New Zealand diplomacy with a steely, and as need be ruthless, resolve that was to be his forte for the rest of his 23 years at the top. Prior to heading External Affairs, he had always worked in the closeted and intimate parliamentary complex--first at the General Assembly Library (1926-35), then in the Prime Minister's Department (1935-43)--where he had mixed with a cluster of...

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