New Zealand international trade negotiations: myths and reality: Ted Woodfield takes issue with a leading historian's account of New Zealand's efforts to protect its economic interests in the late 20th century.

AuthorWoodfield, Ted

It is with a long-term interest in New Zealand history, and my background as a New Zealand trade negotiator for 30 years, that I have read with close interest the writings of New Zealand historians--Keith Sinclair, Michael King and James Belich--covering our international relations in the 20th century. Sinclair studied and wrote with real insight and balance about our relationship with Australia, including trade issues. King, in contrast to the depth of his analysis of many aspects of our political, social and economic development, gives only passing attention to international trade issues.

I have a high regard for Belich's scholarship, in particular his work on the New Zealand Wars. But I have a lesser regard for certain material in his History of the New Zealanders, in particular his second volume Paradise Reforged, published in 2001. In this volume he traces New Zealanders through what he describes as the great transitions of their modern history--our passage from progressive colonisation (up to the 1880s) to recolonisation, and a period he describes as decolonisation, from the 1960s to 2000. Opinions might well vary as to the validity of his analysis and conclusions. He does draw on a wide variety of sources.

I have no hesitation in challenging a section of his work which, in my view, is inaccurate and misleading. When first writing about this a decade ago, I used the term 'myth' in its classical context as a way of describing fictional or unproven things. On subsequent reflection I think a better description would be to say the Belich content of concern to me was based on inadequacies in his research in this area and reliance on sources that were not as well informed as they claimed.

In a chapter on the phase he termed decolonisation-post-1960--Belich refers to several 'change agents'. He describes two as internal and the other two as external-globalisation, and what he describes as

the transformation of New Zealand's main international relationships; disconnection from Britain, the rise and fall of the American alliance, and reconnection with Australia. Each of these relationships had economic, cultural and security dimensions. The most important change was the disconnection from Britain, and the most clear-cut feature of this was economic. I do not seek to debate the validity of his views regarding the significance of the two internal change agents, or globalisation, but I do contest his latter assertion relating to our economic relationship with the United Kingdom. The case he makes for this claim rests on his interpretation of events following the decision of the United Kingdom to join the European Economic Community. In a section in Chapter 15 of Paradise Reforged called 'Exit Britain, Enter World', Belich writes

Britain did not join the EEC until 1973 and painstakingly negotiated transitional provisions meant the New Zealand economy did not feel the full effects of this for about ten years. Yet the imminent demise of recolonization was, surely, obvious well before this. The longsighted had feared that the British market could not grow indefinitely since the early 1930s. The revival of British agriculture was clearly foreshadowed in 1947. Britain's intention to enter the EEC was suspected from 1959 and was plain from 1961. The decline of protein consumption was clear by 1965. Yet New Zealand devoted its efforts less to adapting to the inevitable than to resisting or evading it. In the next section 'Are you my Mother', Belich comments further:

The campaign [to retain our access to the UK market] is sometimes portrayed as very effective. But New Zealand sought permanent and substantial special arrangements, while it got temporary and decreasing ones... [The campaign] absorbed much political and diplomatic effort that might have been better employed developing alternative relationships. But the scale and character of New Zealand's crusade do confirm the strength and persistence of recolonisation in the 1970s. The determined rear guard action finally came to an end in 1988 when the British withdrew their customary support for New Zealand in renegotiating its 'special arrangements' with the European Community. Something had 'damaged the family atmosphere' in residual New Zealand-British relations, and this was the final nail in recolonisation's coffin.

Mistaken perspectives

Many of these statements are based on mistaken perspectives and inadequate understanding of the realities faced by New Zealand ministers and officials involved in our external trade development and our international trade negotiations. The effort put into retaining our British market was essential because after our bulk purchase arrangements with the British terminated in 1954 and despite our unrelenting efforts over the following decades, we were unable, with limited exceptions, to gain certain and secure access for our major export products in other markets.

The protectionist forces in Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and developed Asian countries--all potential targets for our dairy and meat products--were strongly opposed to opening up their markets. It was not until the end of the 1950s that the growth of the fast food industry in the United States led to a sustained demand and market opportunities for grass-fed beef from...

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