New Zealand's jihadis: Aaron Zelin discusses the problem New Zealand faces in dealing with Muslim radicalisation and the danger of participation by its citizens in foreign conflicts.

AuthorZelin, Aaron
PositionEssay

Unlike other Western nations New Zealand, historically, has not had an issue with its Muslim citizens going abroad and joining up in foreign conflicts with Sunni global jihadi groups or with homegrown activism. While the rate of participation remains comparatively low, as a result of the unprecedented flow of foreign fighters to and growth in the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq there are signs that some within New Zealand have been drawn to the fighting or are sympathetic with what is going on. The civil war in Syria has been instrumental in encouraging such involvement.

**********

Unlike many other Western countries and its neighbour Australia, New Zealand historically has not had an issue with members of its Muslim population joining up with Sunni global jihadi groups abroad or sympathising with them at home. It is true that comparatively there still are not that many of these types of individuals in New Zealand, but with the unprecedented number of foreign fighters going to Syria and the rise of the Islamic State, there has been some New Zealand travel to Syria and support in its homeland. This should not lead to an alarmist interpretation, but rather provides an opportunity to illustrate what types of trends are occurring to better situate what is happening within the broader global jihadi milieu and how Kiwi jihadis fit into it. To get at this, this article will first provide background on the Syrian war and the Islamic State, then briefly discuss the historically extremely low rate of New Zealanders joining up with global jihadi organisations; afterwards it will highlight cases of individuals going to Syria as well as the rise in homegrown sympathisers, and lastly discuss how the New Zealand government has responded to this issue.

When the uprising in Syria first broke out in March 2011, like in other countries that saw outbreaks of peaceful protests in the region, jihadists, most specifically al-Qaeda, were flat-footed in their response. Al-Qaeda in Pakistan did not even put out a country-specific statement or video on Syria until February 2012. Although Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) was not officially announced until late January 2012, evidence suggests that it was originally established in the northern summer of 2011. Abu Lokman, a senior JN commander in Aleppo, explained to the BBC in January 2013 that he originally joined the group in its infancy six months prior to its first public video release. This would place JN's founding at the end of July 2011--a timeframe corroborated in interviews with other JN fighters who have spoken with Western and Arab media outlets.

Abu Lokman's date also coincides with Zawahiri's first video related to the Syrian uprising, released on 27 July 2011. In it, he supported the 'Muslims in Bilad al-Sham, the land of ribat, jihad, glory, Arabism, and nobility'. In the context of his latest announcement on Syria, this suggests that al-Qaeda Central had knowledge of--and perhaps even ordered--JN's establishment. In late summer 2011, al-Qaeda's affiliate at the time the Islamic State of Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi dispatched operatives to Syria to set up JN. Among them was Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, the leader of what would become JN, which officially announced itself in late January 2012. By November 2012, Jawlani had built JN into one of the opposition's best fighting forces, and locals viewed its members as fair arbiters when dealing with corruption and social services.

Due to these successes, Baghdadi changed the name of his group from ISI to ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) in April 2013. He likely believed that it was acceptable to publicly announce what was already known: that JN and ISI were one and the same. Yet this did not sit well with Jawlani--he rebuffed the change and reaffirmed his allegiance to AQC chief Zawahiri, who later tried (and failed) to nullify Baghdadi's power play. Amid the confusion, many Syrian jihadis left JN for ISIS, while Baghdadi himself moved from Iraq and established a base in Syria, according to the State Department. ISIS also began to attract a growing number of foreign fighters.

Deadly rift

Therefore, contrary to the media narrative that JN merged with ISIS, the two groups actually separated. Things would only get worse over time. On the evening of 2 February 2014, al-Qaeda's general command released a statement disavowing itself from ISIS: 'ISIS is not a branch of the Qaidat al-Jihad [al-Qaeda's official name] group, we have no organizational relationship with it, and the group is not responsible for its actions.' The rift between al-Qaeda/JN and ISIS at first consisted mainly of sniping between leaders, but turned deadly after that with internecine fighting occurring over the following few months until each group carved out a particular piece of territory.

Then in June 2014, after taking over Mosul and other areas in western Iraq, ISIS announced that it had re-established the Caliphate and was now just calling itself The Islamic State. The takeover of Mosul also supplied the Islamic State with new weapons when it overran Iraqi security forces, which allowed it to then pour these new resources into the Syrian conflict, helping it take more territory in Syria and consolidate its strength in eastern Syria. As a result of all of this, as well as the public beheadings of American and British journalists and humanitarian workers, since the fall of...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT