Preventing state failure: Phil Goff examines New Zealand's decision to intervene in the Solomon Islands.

AuthorGoff, Phil

Three simultaneous crises in the Pacific that confronted New Zealand in the first year of the fifth Labour government took up much of my time as foreign minister. East Timor, Fiji and the Solomon Islands all presented us with different problems requiring different responses.

In East Timor, New Zealand and Australia intervened with military forces on a large scale to prevent further slaughter and destruction. That was followed by a United Nations led effort through military, police and civil support to help rebuild East Timor and create a new nation. In Fiji, yet another coup overthrew an elected government. Military intervention was never considered, but we embarked alongside Australia and the Pacific Forum in prolonged diplomatic efforts to restore legitimate government.

In the Solomon Islands, as that country faced increasing violence, New Zealand and Australia initially resisted calls from the government of the Solomon Islands to send personnel to restore order. But as the country descended further into chaos, Australia and New Zealand, with the support of the Pacific Forum, made decisions which culminated in the creation of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, to respond to state failure.

How and why was the decision made to intervene? What processes did we follow in doing so, including achieving regional support to assist the Solomon Islands? How effective has the intervention been in achieving its objectives, and what were the constraints and limitations on doing so?

First visit

I first visited the Solomon Islands in March 2000. I reported to Cabinet that it was a country where 'fear and tension were palpable' and that 'the situation of violence and lawlessness could worsen with little warning'. In the preceding two years violence had broken out as a result of long-standing resentment by the people of Guadalcanal against settlers from neighbouring Malaita who had married local women and taken control of land. This resulted in Gwale militia groups embarking on ethnic cleansing of over 20,000 Malaitans. The Malaitans in response formed their own militia, the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), which quickly seized control of Honiara. Fighting erupted in which dozens were killed. Law and order collapsed, with the Royal Solomon Islands Police

Force corrupt and dysfunctional at senior and middle levels. The prime minister, Bart Ulufa'alu, sought assistance from Australia and New Zealand, but both countries declined to intervene with military or police. We argued that as outsiders we could not impose solutions on domestic problems and that Solomon Islanders themselves needed to accept responsibility and act to resolve them.

In response to the prime minister's request, we did however agree to provide a neutral venue for parties to the violence to discuss their differences. This had proven a useful form of assistance earlier in the conflict on Bougainville, resulting in the parties moving forward to resolve a war where 10,000 had died. With a repeat of the Burnham Camp style peace talks, we hoped to head off full scale conflict.

Violent confrontations

By June, however, events took their own course with Prime Minister Ulufa'alu taken hostage by the MEF and violent confrontations escalating around Honiara. In response, I went to Honiara with an RNZAF plane to evacuate New Zealanders, and to participate as a member of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT