Putin's tragic miscalculation: Ian Hill discusses the motivations for the Russian invasion of Its south-western neighbour.

• Author: Hill, Ian

Russia's invasion of Ukraine took even seasoned Kremlin-watchers aback. It should not have. To understand why, we need to consider the drivers of Russia's Ukraine policy, and the wider context of Russia's post-Cold War foreign and strategic policy settings.

What is notable is that, for all the change Russia has gone through in the post-Soviet period, the threads of continuity run deeply and strongly throughout Russian politics and society--including its foreign policy.

Through much of the 1990s, and even in the early years of President Vladimir Putin's leadership, there were hopes of closer relations between Russia and Western countries and institutions. There were even suggestions, perhaps not altogether serious, that Russia might join NATO. Immediately after 9/11, Putin was among the first foreign leaders to convey sympathy to the White House, and commit to co-operate in countering international terrorism. But hopes for a more co-operative relationship between Russia and the West proved ephemeral. Why?

Russia blames the United States for purportedly not abiding by its post-Cold War commitments--including the disputed contention that Washington promised Moscow in 1989 there would be no eastward expansion of NATO--and for failing to respect Russian interests through the difficult times of the 1990s.

That is debatable. But there is certainly no doubt that the searing impact of that decade on the Russian psyche endures: it is a decade remembered by many ordinary Russians as one of political chaos, economic collapse and foreign policy humiliation. The current Russian ruling elite nurtures a bitter sense of grievance and resentment towards the West that still pervades its foreign policy approach today.

In fact, then, for Putin and his fellow siloviki (literally, in Russian, 'strongmen', sharing a background in Russia's security services), the Cold War never really ended. Publicly, though, the dramatic turning point came in February 2007, with Putin's combative Munich Conference speech, in which he rejected US geopolitical primacy and sharply criticised NATO's eastward expansion. Russia's more openly assertive and belligerent foreign policy approach dates from that time, leading via Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), Syria (2015), through now to Ukraine.

Enduring priorities

President Putin's current aggressive bid to subjugate Ukraine, bringing it back firmly into Russia's orbit, is entirely consistent with the Kremlin's longstanding strategic outlook and concerns. It is also an objective Putin has pursued, in various ways, throughout his 22-year-long presidency--most notably in 2004 and again in 2013-14.

Broadly, Putin's overriding objective over the past two decades has been to restore and strengthen the Kremlin's centralised authority at home, suppressing dissent, while reasserting Russia's power, status and influence in its neighbourhood and beyond: a country acknowledged and respected internationally as a great power and an indispensable partner in managing global and regional issues.

And the lesson Putin has drawn from his experience of the past two decades has been that for Russia to be taken seriously, it needs a strong and capable modern military force: hard power is what counts. This core objective, and the strategic view underpinning it, is an enduring Russian one, falling squarely into the tradition of Soviet, and before that, Tsarist imperial foreign policy.

Today, as in the past, the Kremlin sees the world through a lens of suspicion, insecurity and threats. This is rooted in Russian history and geography. Lacking physical barriers...