Reflections on the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy: Manqing Cheng comments on the origins and development of the emerging Indo-Pacific security architecture.

• Author: Cheng, Manqing

The US geopolitical goal in the post-Cold War era is to control the edge of Eurasia and prevent the emergence of a country or group of countries in the region that threatens American hegemony. Due to the unbalanced political and economic development in the world, US power relative to Eurasian countries is declining. In American eyes, China and Russia pose both potential threats and actual challenges to its hegemony. China, in particular, has a growing economy, a strengthening military and an increasing regional and global influence that worries the United States. In response, Washington launched its Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy. However, with accelerating Chinese naval construction challenging the rebalancing at sea, the United States has turned to an Indo-Pacific strategy. (1)

Applied to such a vast area, the Indo-Pacific strategy is bound to face diplomatic, military and financial obstacles. There are many uncertainties in terms of alliances and partnerships. The Biden administration's approach incorporates the essence of President Obama's Asia-Pacific rebalance and President Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy. The aim is to build networked security architecture. India is an important 'link point'. With rising border tensions with China, New Delhi has high expectations for the India-US relationship under President Biden, as Indian foreign service officer Neelam Deo observed last year: 'advisers to Presidential-hopeful Joe Biden have privately admitted that Trump got many things right on China. Therefore, if there is a change in the US administration, it is expected that Biden will pursue a similar policy towards China'. (2) As a member of the Quad and a neighbour of China, India is bound to be a key element in the US strategy towards China, and this is bound to have positive effect on India-US relations. Given increasing US assistance to the Indian Navy in recent years, the United States naturally expects India to contribute to maritime security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Even so, the two sides have enough disagreements to ensure that the future of US-India relations will not be entirely smooth.

First, differences between the two countries on the mode of military co-operation have not been completely resolved. India has emphasised joint research and development and joint production of military equipment. It seeks to absorb US advanced military technology and production capacity by skipping the customer stage and directly producing, using and even exporting equipment. US defence co-operation with India is clearly not designed to create a rival that might ultimately challenge its position; nor does it want to drive India into going its own way, thereby ceding the huge economic benefits of arms exports to India.

Second, there are institutional obstacles to US-India cooperation. On the one hand, US defence co-operation, especially arms sales, often requires congressional approval. For Washington, this is a very serious domestic political issue over which it has little control. On the other hand, India's Defence Department is wedded to localisation. Long-term Indian defence co-operation with Russia has created a certain dependence in the military field, and in the short run a full switch to American equipment is neither realistic nor feasible.

Third, the Russian factor also has an important influence on the direction of US-India relations. In October 2018, India signed a US$5 billion deal with Russia to buy five units of the S-400 air defence missile system. US Senator Bob Menendez once said that

if India chose to go forward with its plan to purchase the Russian S-400 missile system, it would clearly constitute a sanctionable transaction with the Russian defence sector ... It will also limit India's ability to work with the US on development and procurement of sensitive military technology. (3) Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has put great pressure on the Modi government, which is leading to a social, political and economic crisis in India. The pandemic has also dealt a certain blow to India's geopolitical ambitions. While India is more Western-oriented than ever, it is not in favour of a sharp confrontation with China. Recently, both countries have taken simultaneous measures to ease tensions over their border dispute. Therefore, the Biden administration's diplomacy with India still faces a number of challenges and uncertainties, which will test the US strategic patience in the future.

Australian adjustment

The adjustment of Australia's defence strategy outlined in its 2020 Defence Strategic Update issued on 1 July 20204 will undoubtedly have significant impact on the regional security situation. First, Australia aims at a closer military alliance with the United States and greater influence on the security pattern in the Indo-Pacific region, even if it will be reluctant to directly involve itself in the US-China conflict. With its present or foreseeable future military and overall strength, Australia cannot alone provide the security of the 'area of most direct strategic interest' to it in the Indo-Pacific region. As a result, the Australia-US alliance will remain strong for a long time to come. Such stability is based in part on...