Should war define New Zealand's self-view? Terence O'Brien argues that good international citizenship not war involvement should underpin New Zealand's sense of place in the world.

• Author: O'Brien, Terence
• Position: Report

New Zealand's sense of place in the world has for a century or more been influenced through intermittent experiences of distant warfare. It derived from colonial inheritance and a sense of separation from pakeha cultural roots, which drove a psychology of dependency and an enduring concern to demonstrate that, despite geography, New Zealand remained a reliable, dependable partisan of Atlantic/European values and interests. New Zealand's self-view in the future is perhaps less likely to be influenced by war as such than by perceived threat of insecurity and by fundamental shifts to the tectonic plates below the international landscape.

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New Zealand's worldview is shaped by geography, size, resources, colonial inheritance, external trade and intermittent experience of distant warfare. Each of those factors makes its own impact upon our perceptions of New Zealand identity. What the country is, and seeks to be, are central to its sense of place. New Zealand's originality resides largely with the Treaty of Waitangi with a commitment to reconciliation at the core of its democracy, which strives to blend Maori and European contributions to cohesive nation-building--while adjusting to a multicultural future. Those origins and that challenge ahead will define the New Zealand world journey in the 21st century.

The task of reconciliation is complex, diversified and sometimes controversial and represents an enduring rite of passage for the country and its nationhood. Other countries, particularly those Anglo-Saxon democracies with which New Zealand likes to compare itself, possess no equivalent. Some have a more chequered record in relation to indigenous people, and preservation of harmonious racial order. In an era of international relations where the idea of 'soft power', as distinct from the hard power of sheer military and economic strength, is valued and promoted, New Zealand has credentials. Soft power is not the monopoly of the strong. It defines whatever contribution a small non-threatening conscientious contributor to international relations can make. The extent to which it nourishes evenhandedness and a potential for impartiality is important for New Zealand soft power.

It is remarkable, nonetheless, the extent to which New Zealand's sense of place in the world has for a century or more been influenced through intermittent experiences of distant warfare. For such a remote country with a traditionally low sense of threat to its own physical existence, this is a curious birthmark. The explanation derives, of course, from our colonial inheritance and a sense of separation from pakeha cultural roots. This drove a psychology of dependency and an enduring concern to demonstrate that, despite geography, New Zealand remains a reliable, dependable partisan of Atlantic/European values and interests. The 21st century is already, however, providing a test for this traditional foundation beneath New Zealand external relations.

Two world wars, conflicts in Korea, Vietnam and Malaysia and UN peace-making operations in sundry places add up to a sturdy New Zealand record of burden sharing in the international business of peace support. Membership variously in military alliances (SEATO, ANZUS, the Canberra Pact) serves as proof of New Zealand vigilance. Our prolonged four-year commemoration of New Zealand involvement in the First World War (1914-18) represents an extensive tribute to the valour of the New Zealand effort. It recalls that New Zealand pattern of traditional dependency at the very moment when new dependencies increasingly, however, shape New Zealand's sense of place. It recalls, too, severe blunders and mistaken ambitions on the part of northern hemisphere politicians and commanders that cost New Zealand dear. Has that lesson been retained?

That is a fair question at a time when, once again, New Zealand has implicated defence forces in the Middle East. It is remarkable, indeed, the extent to which the intermittent New Zealand experience of distant warfare has centred around the Middle East and its neighbourhood. There remains an embedded conviction amongst New Zealand defence policy-makers, reflected in government defence white papers, that this distant region should be a focus for New Zealand military effort, although there is no apparent disposition to deepen independent understanding of the lessons or complexities which that region now provides. The judgments and interests of others dictate New Zealand's decisions.

Defence policy

A small professional New Zealand Defence Force remains a real national asset for the simple reason that it is itself a product of New Zealand society that traditionally embodies fair mindedness, evenhandedness, dependability and potential for impartiality. For obvious reasons New Zealand defence planning is predicated on an abiding assumption that only in the most exceptional circumstances would the force operate as a stand-alone contingent.

Inter-operability with like-minded others is the presumed rule of thumb reflected in the partnerships and coalitions New Zealand seeks to join. These particularly involve NATO countries and especially the United States, but so far exclude interoperability exercising one-on-one with East Asian defence forces. Successive New Zealand political leadership has commanded, nonetheless, a 'whole of government' approach to Asian relationship-building. It is not clear just how far the NZDF is actually on board with that overall New Zealand blueprint for relationships in important Asian countries--beyond occasional rhetoric and some conventional defence diplomacy.

Official defence language about what drives New Zealand coalition choices emphasises the importance of common values, ideals and democracy when seeking partnerships. While at one level this may be convincing, actual international experience with conflict over the past 100 years points in a different direction. It proves clearly that common values or ideals do not explain alignments in times of need--communists and...