Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission COA

JurisdictionNew Zealand
JudgeGlazebrook J
Judgment Date27 June 2012
Neutral Citation[2012] NZCA 278
Docket NumberCA700/2009
CourtCourt of Appeal
Date27 June 2012
BETWEEN
Telecom Corporation Of New Zealand Limited
First Appellant
Telecom New Zealand Limited
Second Appellant
and
Commerce Commission
Respondent

[2012] NZCA 278

Court:

Glazebrook, Chambers and Ellen France JJ

CA700/2009

In The Court Of Appeal Of New Zealand

Appeal from High Court decision which held appellant had breached s36 Commerce Act 1986 (“CA”) (taking advantage of market power) from 2001 to 2004 — wholesale charges to rival telecommunications service providers for access to data tails were high relative to the retail price creating a price squeeze and breached the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (“ECPR”) — whether the ECPR was a guide rather than a price ceiling — whether the High Court erred by not following the United States approach to price squeeze claims — whether appellant had an obligation to supply data tails — whether appellant's pricing involved a purpose proscribed by s36 CA (restricting the entry of a person into that market or preventing or deterring a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any other market) — whether appellant's anti–competitive behaviour had commenced prior to 2001.

Counsel:

D Shavin QC, J E Hodder SC, P Jagose and T Smith for First and Second Appellants

J A Farmer QC, G M Coumbe and J S McHerron for Respondent

NOTE: ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF THE JUDGMENT IN NEWS MEDIA OR ON THE INTERNET OR OTHER PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATABASE UNTIL 12 PM 2 JULY 2012.

  • A The appeal is dismissed.

  • B The cross-appeal is allowed.

  • C The declaration made in the High Court is amended to read as follows:

  • The plaintiff is granted a declaration that Telecom used and/or took advantage of its dominant position/market power from 1 February 1999 until late 2004 (when Telecom introduced a UPC service) for the purposes of deterring potential or existing competitors in the wholesale market for backbone transmissionservices and the retail market for end-to-end high speed data transmission services.

  • D The appellants must pay the respondent costs for a complex appeal on a band B basis and usual disbursements. We certify for three counsel.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
REASONS

Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ

[1]

Chambers J

[281]

GLAZEBROOK AND ELLEN FRANCE JJ

(Given by Glazebrook J)

Table of Contents

Para No

Introduction

[1]

The legislation

[10]

Technical background

[13]

Telecom's pricing structure

[21]

Retail pricing

[21]

Wholesale pricing

[29]

Pricing of data tails

[39]

The High Court judgment

[39]

Market definition

[39]

Dominance/market power

[41]

Use of dominant position

[42]

Use of dominance for proscribed purpose

[53]

telecom v clear litigation

[56]

Explanation of ECPR

[64]

Issues on appeal

[74]

Is ECPR merely a safe harbour rather than a price ceiling?

[79]

Telecom's argument

[79]

Our assessment

[80]

(a) ECPR is not, by itself, sufficient to ensure efficiency

[81]

(b) The Privy Council's application of ECPR

[86]

(c) No alternative model proposed

[89]

Does requiring ECPR breach the need for commercial certainty?

[92]

Telecom's argument

[192]

Did the High Court err by not following the United States approach to price squeeze claims?

[104]

Telecom's argument

[104]

Our assessment

[105]

(a) United States cases

[105]

(b) European Union cases

[113]

(c) Summary

[120]

Did the High Court err in concluding that Telecom had an obligation to supply data tails to competitors?

[125]

Telecom's argument

[125]

Our assessment

[128]

(a) Did the High Court reach its conclusion independently of the counterfactual?

[128]

(b) Can this case be distinguished from Telecom v Clear and Queensland Wire?

[133]

Did the High Court err in concluding that a non-dominant Telecom would not have supplied data tails to competitors at a price that exceeded ECPR?

[144]

Telecom's argument

[144]

Our assessment

[148]

(a) Direct observation

[148]

(b) The issue of marginal cost

[154]

(c) The Bertrand model of competition

[160]

Did the High Court err in concluding that the Commission had proved that the Telecom pricing in the two-tail scenario in fact relevantly breached ECPR?

[162]

Telecom's argument

[165]

Our assessment

[171

(a) Breach in the aggregate

[171]

(b) Level of proof and the de minimis approach

[187]

(c) Were two-tail providers inherently inefficient?

[198]

(d) Bundled services

[205]

(e) CBR vs VBR

[211]

Additional issues

[218]

Settlement agreement

[218]

Avoided costs

[222]

Did the High Court err in concluding that the Commission had not proved that the Telecom pricing in the one-tail scenario breached ECPR?

[226]

The High Court judgment

[226]

The parties’ arguments

[227]

Our assessment

[230]

(a) Were the High Court's examples of one-tail pricing inconsistent with ECPR principles?

[230]

(b) Would the inclusion of profit foregone on Telecom's entire network in the ECPR price lead to the exclusion of competitors?

[233]

(c) Additional considerations

[238]

(d) Was the way in which the High Court applied ECPR in the one-tail scenario inconsistent with the counterfactual?

[243]

(e) What is the effect of the above analysis?

[247]

Did the High Court err in finding that the Commission had proved that the Telecom pricing involved a purpose proscribed by s 36 of the Commerce Act 1986?

[253]

Telecom's argument

[256]

Our assessment

[259]

(a) Inference of anti-competitive purpose

[259]

(b) Direct evidence

[268]

Conclusion

[278]

Introduction
1

Telecom inherited its telecommunications network from the Post Office when the telecommunications industry was privatised in 1989. The telecommunications network is used to transmit information that has been converted into digital format. During the 1990s, rival telecommunications service providers (TSPs) 1 sought access to Telecom's network in order to provide their own data transmission services. This access was achieved by TSPs utilising data tails, which are the connection between an end customer's premises and the point where a rival TSP can take delivery of data signals from Telecom. 2 This appeal concerns Telecom's pricing of those data tails.

2

In the High Court, the Commerce Commission alleged that, over the period from 1 December 1998 until late 2004, 3 the wholesale price charged by Telecom to other TSPs for access to data tails was so high relative to Telecom's retail price that it caused a price squeeze. A price squeeze occurs when a dominant vertically integrated supplier sets prices in the upstream wholesale market in a manner that prevents equally or more efficient competitors from profitably operating in the downstream retail market.

3

In particular, it was alleged by the Commission that Telecom's pricing breached the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) endorsed by the Privy Council in Telecom v Clear 4 as the appropriate pricing model where there is a dominant vertically integrated provider of network infrastructure and services. Under ECPR the price of an input equals its average-incremental cost as well as a sum sufficient to compensate the incumbent for its opportunity costs. “Opportunity cost” refers to all potential earnings that the supplying firm foregoes, either by providing inputs of its own rather than purchasing them, or by offering services to competitors that force it to relinquish business to those rivals and thus to forego the profits on that lost business. 5

4

In a judgment delivered on 9 October 2009 (we will refer to this as the Liability Judgment), 6 Rodney Hansen J and Professor Martin Richardson held that Telecom's pricing was above ECPR in virtually all cases where Telecom provided all the tails in a TSP's customer network, whether two or more, and the TSP did not self-provide any tails (the “two-tail” scenario). The Court did not consider that Telecom's pricing breached ECPR in cases where a TSP self-provided one or more tails and Telecom supplied the remainder (the “one-tail” scenario).

5

On the basis of those findings, it was held that Telecom had used and/or taken advantage of its dominant position/market power from 18 March 2001 until late 2004 for the purpose of deterring potential or existing competitors in the wholesale market for backbone transmission services and the retail market for end-to-end high speed data transmission (HSDT) services. 7

6

Telecom had therefore breached s 36 of the Commerce Act 1986. The High Court concluded that the Commission was entitled to relief (both declaratory and pecuniary) in respect of Telecom's conduct in that period. The Court granted the

Commission declaratory relief with respect to Telecom's conduct between 18 March 2001 until late 2004, but not with respect to Telecom's conduct prior to 18 March 2001
7

Telecom appeals against the Liability Judgment. There is a cross-appeal by the Commission, asserting that declaratory relief should have been available for the period prior to 18 March 2001. 8 The Commission also seeks to challenge the Liability Judgment on the basis that the High Court should have found that Telecom's pricing in the one-tail scenario breached ECPR. 9

8

The issue of the quantum of the remedy by way of pecuniary penalty was dealt with in a separate judgment. 10 Telecom also appeals against that decision. 11 We will deal with that appeal in a separate judgment.

9

Before we turn to the issues in the appeal against the Liability Judgment, 12 we set out the legislative background, 13 explain the technical background in more detail 14 and describe Telecom's pricing structure. 15 We then summarise...

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