The United States in Iraq: assessment and outlook: Bill Harris finds positive aspects to the American intervention in Iraq.

• Author: Harris, Bill

The American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in March/April 2003 represented the most dramatic shock to the Middle Eastern political order since the British overthrow of Ottoman Turkish rule in 1918. Washington's stated intention to foster a pluralist democratic regime--a model for the Arab world--in place of Saddam Hussein's Ba'thist dictatorship has made developments inside Iraq challenging to neighbouring states in a fashion unprecedented since the Seljuk Turkish takeover of Baghdad in 1055. A democratic and decentralised Iraq, with a Shi'ite preponderance in central political institutions and entrenched rights for the Kurds, could only be profoundly disturbing for the rest of the mainly Sunni Muslim Arab world. What might it mean for Syria's Ba'thists, for the Saudi monarchy, and for ethnic and sectarian communities from Lebanon to Algeria?

Transformation of the United States from a super-power upholding a Middle Eastern status quo of conservative authoritarian regimes into a force for revolutionary change derives from the 11 September 2001 terrorist events. The attacks on New York and Washington exposed the violent religious radicalism being incubated under the cover of the status quo, particularly in Saudi Arabia. It remains to be seen whether or not the United States has taken on more than it can manage in Iraq, but the consequences of failure of the US project would be catastrophic both for the Middle East and for the US global position. Iraq is not Panama or Haiti--it is potentially the richest and most powerful state in the Arab world, and holder of the largest alternative oil reservoir to Saudi Arabia. Unlike Vietnam, which was always a strategic sideshow, Iraq is at the centre of the region containing most of the world's premier strategic resource and the world's most high-profile extremist movements.

Collapse of the US project amid the disintegration of Iraq would give a tremendous boost to authoritarianism and religious fanaticism throughout the Middle East. The Palestinians, famous for their political myopia, would do well to ponder the likely consequences for themselves--US humiliation in Iraq and subsequent disinterest in the Israeli-Palestinian issue would leave the West Bank and Gaza at the mercy of Israeli right-wing politicians with greatly reinforced influence in Washington. On the global level, failure in Baghdad would strip away the psychological aura of the United States as the world's single super-power, possibly even terminating the current 'unipolar' phase in international affairs.

Potential benefits

Success in nurturing a pluralist Iraq with a resurgent economy and close relations with Washington, on the other hand, would open the way to a restructured Middle East. The US-Iraqi relationship would become the pivot of the American strategic position in the region, sidelining Saudi Arabia, squeezing Ba'thist Syria, and deeply affecting the competition between reformers and hardliners in Iran. The United States would also have a pressing incentive finally to produce a fair resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, unless the behaviour of the nest of the Arab world leads the 80 per cent of Iraqis who are Shi'ites or Kurds to turn away from Arab causes.

In view of the extraordinarily high stakes it is useful to compile a preliminary balance sheet of the situation in the various parts of Iraq six months after the overthrow of the Ba'thist regime. It is also worth considering the posture of neighbouring states, particularly Syria and Iran. Overall, the US-led coalition retains the initiative in late 2003, but decisive constitutional, security, and economic advances are imperative before mid-2004, when the US effort may well be undercut by negative US domestic opinion trends as the November 2004 presidential elections draw closer.

Across Iraq, the US/British-dominated coalition seeks to provide the rudiments of an improved existence for the population while its armed opponents, whether Ba'thist remnants of religious militants, seek to disrupt this endeavour. Despite mounting resentments by ordinary Iraqis toward coalition forces, the United States still has advantages in the struggle. First, the 'resistance' has no positive programme for Iraq, as indicated by its assaults on Iraqi civilians, and no local extension beyond a portion of the Sunni Arab minority, itself less than 20 per cent of the population. Second, by November 2003 the coalition had made progress in establishing interim political institutions, and restoring electricity and other services to levels better than the situation of Saddam's last years. The US-commanded Coalition Provisional Authority fostered new municipal authorities through much of Iraq, Including multi-level local government in Greater Baghdad. It also appointed a 25-member Iraqi Governing Council, including an array of significant Iraqi factions, to operate ministries and represent Iraq abroad, though coalition officials soon became frustrated with the council's lethargy and limited public impact. Third, the population knows that United States and British forces provide the only...