Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian--Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-5.

• Author: Rabel, Roberto
• Position: Books

CONFRONTING SUKARNO: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian--Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-5 Author: John Subritzky Published by: Macmillan, London, 2000, 246pp, $180.

The Vietnam War has long overshadowed the history of Western diplomatic and military intervention in South-east Asia in the 1960s. Yet, for a time, many policy-makers in London, Washington, Canberra and Wellington were equally anxious about the implications of the so-called policy of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) adopted by Indonesia's President Sukarno against the new federated state of Malaysia. As John Subritzky notes, this struggle was highly significant for the larger Cold War in Asia. After all, one possible outcome was that Indonesia -- a far more populous, politically influential and strategically located country than Vietnam -- might become a permanently aggrieved, anti-Western and pro-Chinese power. The alternative of acceding to Sukarno's demands would have seriously weakened Western influence in the region as well as imperilling Malaysia's viability as an independent state. This well-crafted study examines how the British, American, Australian and New Zealand governments responded to these dilemmas.

Three central concerns shaped their responses: `dealing with the unpredictable Sukarno, containing communism in South-east Asia and the Commonwealth's future role in the region', lake the Vietnam War, therefore, Confrontation illustrated the interplay in Southeast Asia between assertive nationalism, the Cold War and efforts to preserve Western influence in the region in a period of decolonisation. Unlike Vietnam, the outcome was far more positive from a Western perspective, given the nature of the regimes which would emerge in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.

In tracing how this conflict unfolded, Subritzky highlights the differences between the four powers in dealing with the challenge of Confrontation. In the case of the United States, he argues that Indonesia represented a crucial test of the Kennedy administration's strategy of outdoing its Sino-Soviet adversaries in getting on side with Third World nationalism. Consequently, the Americans were reluctant to risk nudging the volatile Sukarno into the communist camp by opposing outright his policy against Malaysia. In contrast, Indonesia's action dashed London's hopes of shedding the burdens of empire while still retaining informal influence in a pro-British Malaysia. Much discord...