Multilateralism and world order: Terence O'Brien criticises the United States' new doctrine of pre-emptive intervention and urges the importance of a rules-based approach.

• Author: O'Brien, Terence

How do we define the present context for world affairs? We invented the epigram Cold War to describe that period of something over 40 years that ended in 1989-90, during which the Soviet Union with its allies and the United States with its allies confronted one another materially and ideologically with massive reciprocal power, on hairtrigger alert.

That was an era of deterrence, containment, confrontation and security based on competitive military alliances. How valid were the perceptions that produced this era of great disconnection is something of an open question. But the facts were, or are, that that was the way of things. (1)

In 1989-90, to everyone's surprise, the Cold War abruptly ended. There was much wisdom after the event amongst intelligence agencies, think tanks and security specialists concerned over their reputations for prophecy. The Cold War was succeeded by an era unimaginatively described, for want of any, better term, as the post-Cold War. Whilst this sudden relaxation of Cold War tensions proved to be a time of significant internal disruption in several regions of the world, the new period ushered in for international relations 'a world without enemies'. In conjunction with the rapid globalisation of economic activity, this radically new situation called for fundamental revision in security thinking and practice. Reassurance, co-operation, collaboration, even-handedness (or equity) between states were requisite operating principles in a post-Cold War era. (2) The need to conceive security in a comprehensive way grew more compelling. Notwithstanding the later eruption of international terror, these principles still retain their validity today. Attention turned to concepts of conflict prevention, of conflict resolution and of preventive diplomacy that became the fashionable preoccupation of governments, international institutions and the academic world. (3)

But the mentality of the Cold War did not evaporate. For those who interpreted its sudden end as 'victory' for Western values, ideas and interests, there was no case to change a winning formula. The demon of 'uncertainty' was therefore summoned to justify enhanced military vigilance, including more lethal weapons systems. At the same time the dangers increased of the uncontrolled spread of all such weapons by the very ease and speed of the globalising movement of people, goods, hot money, crime and other afflictions across national boundaries. It must be said, as we now confront the enormously difficult problems of proliferation of highly dangerous weapons everywhere, that uncertainty is a notably imprecise foundation for clear thinking about security.

Terrorist thunderbolt

Yet "after barely ten years the post-Cold War era was dramatically submerged by the thunderbolt of 11 September 2001. Terrorism is, of course, hardly new. But the hideous attacks on the most powerful nation in recorded history that shattered its sense of impregnability, and generated wide sympathy for it, ensure that the scourge of international terrorism now imbues international relations. The pundits have not yet really devised a description for this new era. The events are still too recent in our collective memory for us to be certain, moreover, about the direction that international relations will follow. The responses so far, especially as they implicate Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East and which lack vital consensus within the international community, do not provide clear or coherent bearings to judge the future. One can only itemise key considerations that must influence the way New Zealand positions itself as the era unfolds.

First, there are inherent complications with the notion that the world has in fact entered an era to be described as a war against international terrorism. The idea of war implies victory (or defeat) through military means alone; yet much of recent experience confirms that the causes, as well as the symptoms, of terrorism need to be pursued collectively--that is one lesson from Northern Ireland. The description creates the illusion, too, that there is one enemy (like the Soviet Union in the Cold War), but terrorism is a tool of random violence not a finite entity. (4) Given its essential nature, we will never be certain, moreover, when or if ultimate...