New Zealand's defence posture: a new direction? Leighton Luke sees the possibility of at last laying the foundations for a more broadly bipartisan approach to defence policy.

• Author: Luke, Leighton

The commitment to a new Defence white paper made by Prime Minister John Key's National Party-led government in its 2008 election campaign could once more re-ignite discussions regarding the focus and capabilities of the New Zealand Defence Force. Given that, even in the face of the existing straitened economic circumstances, the NZDF's current operational tempo is unlikely to slow dramatically any time soon--as of February 2009, 488 NZDF personnel are deployed on fourteen different missions around the world, including a contingent of 129 personnel stationed in Afghanistan--the white paper will be a far from purely academic exercise. Other factors in the equation include the reality that New Zealand is a trade-dependent maritime nation with the world's fifth-largest exclusive economic zone, and the very warm state of New Zealand-United States relations, particularly since the White House came to accept that no New Zealand government was likely to commit electoral suicide by repealing the anti-nuclear legislation. This time around, there is also a real possibility for consultation and consensus, with the potential for a bipartisan approach to de fence policy that has not been possible for several decades. Furthermore, as Australia is New Zealand's most important defence partner, Wellington's defence decisions are also likely to be viewed with interest by Canberra.

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Once released, the 2009 white paper will be the first in twelve years. The National Party-led government of Jenny Shipley produced the wide-ranging, but under-funded, 1997 Defence white paper. Almost immediately upon taking office in 1999, Helen Clark's Labour Party-led government controversially reversed the Shipley government's high profile acquisition of 28 ex-US Air Force F-16A/B Fighting Falcon fighter aircraft, which were to be leased over a ten-year period at a cost of $362 million, with the option to then purchase the aircraft for a further $287 million. The F-16s were intended to replace the fleet of A-4K Skyhawks that constituted the air combat force of the RNZAF, but, citing an 'incredibly benign' strategic environment in which the use of the air combat force was seen as unlikely to ever be required, Clark's government wasted no time in reviewing and, ultimately, cancelling the deal.

Clark also confirmed the decision made in 1998 by the Shipley government not to purchase a third Anzac-class frigate and announced that, as part of a wider programme to re-focus and re-equip the RNZN, the government would instead purchase a multi-role vessel--HMNZS Canterbury--designed to provide sealift and patrol capabilities in a range of maritime environments extending through the Pacific and southern oceans.

Momentous decisions

These were momentous decisions, and the NZDF has in many ways benefited from a certain rigour in the approach adopted by the Clark government. However, those decisions were not made as the result of a wide-ranging process of consultation, as would have been the case under a traditional white paper. Instead, they were largely (although not exclusively) made as a result of the submissions received by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee, and the recommendations contained in two reports produced by Derek Quigley for the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. (1)

It is, however, interesting to note that, despite the fact that the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 report essentially became the Clark government's blueprint for the future of the NZDF--under which defence capabilities were closely aligned with the government's security and foreign policy agenda--Quigley had nonetheless recommended that the government proceed with the F-16 deal, albeit for a lesser quantity of aircraft. Whatever faults these and other defence planning documents produced under the Clark government may have had--they were, after all, products of their time--one of their greatest failings was probably the lack of wide-ranging public consultation, upon which a consensus regarding the future of the NZDF could have been built. In this regard, Prime Minister Key's commitment to a white paper represents a definite break with the Clark era.

In view of the above what, then, might be in store for the NZDF under the Key government? According to National's Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Discussion Paper, released prior to the 2008 election and in which the party committed to publishing a Defence white paper in its first year of government, the aforesaid white paper will focus on three main themes: the capabilities required for the NZDF to meet New Zealand's security interests; staff recruitment and retention strategies; and a review of defence procurement and budgetary processes. In view of the more administrative nature of the latter two themes, this review shall take the former as its focus.

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Defined interests

National has defined New Zealand's security interests as being based on New Zealand's own, independent assessment of its security environment. That is, firstly, to ensure the security of the South Pacific region and, secondly, the building of international peace and security to ensure 'an open and secure world where trade and commerce can be freely undertaken'. (2) Admirable sentiments indeed, but, on the face of...