Defence policy in the Asian century: Hugh White provides some reflections from the 'West Island' on New Zealand's new defence white paper.

• Author: White, Hugh

Back in 2000, almost ten years ago now, New Zealand and Australia each took a hard look at their respective defence policies, and made some important changes. Now, on both sides of the Tasman we are doing it again, as new governments in Wellington and Canberra fulfil election promises to produce new defence white papers. Last time the two countries took somewhat different directions. This divergence confirmed and consolidated differences in strategic orientation that had become evident back in the mid-1980s, when Wellington and Canberra took different approaches to nuclear matters.

But the roots of that divergence can be found much deeper in the two countries' histories, geographies and strategic cultures. (1) We are, and have always been, less alike in our strategic outlooks than we generally realise, certainly on the western side of the Tasman. But that only makes it more interesting, and more valuable, to compare and contrast the issues and questions that each country faces as we review our defence policies. My hope is that we can each learn something from the different perspectives offered by the other.

New Zealand defence policy is a tricky subject for any Australian; somehow the tact and sensitivity for which we West Islanders are so famous deserts us when we turn to this topic. And my own credentials for talking about New Zealand's defence are slim, especially when compared to the dedicated and talented New Zealanders who have made this their life's work. To excuse my temerity I can claim only a deep affection for New Zealand reaching back many decades; the benefit of close collegial relations with a number of outstanding New Zealand strategic thinkers, including today in Canberra many valued ANU colleagues, among them Rob Ayson and Brendan Taylor; and frequent chances to learn from officials and observers in Wellington over 25 years of sometimes close engagement with the trans-Tasman defence relationship, beginning in that eventful year of 1984. I suppose I can claim to have been 'Present at the Destruction' of New Zealand's old ANZUS-based defence posture, and have watched with interest the development of its successor ever since.

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In this article I offer what will obviously be an Australian perspective on the issues that the two countries face as they develop their new defence white papers. I do this in three steps. First, I say one or two things about white papers in general; then explain a little about how I see the questions facing those preparing the new Australian white paper; and finally venture some thoughts on the questions I think the New Zealand white paper could or should cover.

Two kinds

What is a defence white paper for? There are two kinds of defence policy review, whether they are called a 'white paper' or not. One kind aims simply to confirm the policy status quo, and ginger up the management. Usually this kind of paper explains (or asserts) that the policy which has been in place for the past few years remains just right for the next few decades, and then promises to make the implementation of the policy more efficient. We might call this the shallow kind of white paper. That is not necessarily meant to be derogatory: shallow white papers have their place. As long as we really are sure that the kinds of forces that have served us well in the past will keep doing so in future, it is a waste of time and money to go back to fundamentals every few years. And, of course, better management Is always needed.

The other kind of white paper--what we might call by contrast a 'deep' white paper--goes back to fundamentals and asks again the big questions that constitute the foundations of defence policy. What strategic risks do we apprehend? What role can our armed forces play in managing those risks? What tasks do we therefore want our forces to be able to perform? What capabilities are needed to perform them? How much are we willing to spend? A deep white paper should answer all these questions, and do so in a connected way that aligns strategic objectives, capability priorities and funding commitments, so that out aims, our means and our resources all match up.

First step

The first step, then, in producing a white paper is to decide whether you want to dive deep or stay shallow. The policy review process that resulted in New Zealand's Defence Policy Framework of 2000 and A Modern Sustainable Defence Force of 2001 dived very deep and came up with some radical changes. So, too, did Australia's 2000 defence white paper--though not as deep as in New Zealand.

Much has happened since that work was done, however. This time round the Rudd government in Canberra talks as if it wants to do a deep white paper, though much of the process seems to be focused on management rather than strategic issues. The result has been a rather complex and protracted process that has run overtime and risks getting bogged down in management detail at the expense of strategic direction. Whether this turns out to be the case is still too early to say, but the temptation to settle for a shallow white paper is clearly beckoning.

The same might be true in Wellington. The new government seems to have built a new consensus about the foundations of defence policy, having essentially embraced the key decisions made by their predecessors since 2000. Having done that, it might seem both unnecessary and troublesome to go back and unpack the fundamentals again. Like their colleagues in Canberra, they will perhaps be tempted to take the strategic framework as given and focus instead on management.

For reasons which I will make clear a little later, these temptations should be resisted: both Australia and New Zealand need to do deep white papers in 2009. Of course, efficient management and capability delivery is essential and needs attention. But getting the broad direction right is always the first priority. It does not help much to work hard doing the wrong things more efficiently, so it is always sensible to be sure what you are trying to do before thinking too much about how best to do it. That is certainly true today. Both countries face deep questions about strategic risks, objectives and priorities, and these should be the key focus of our new defence white papers.

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Bottom line

What does this kind of deep white paper look like? The bottom line of a thorough defence review is a new programme of long-term capability development. But the list of investment priorities is the endpoint of the process, not the beginning. In the defence-policy equation that links strategy, capability and dollars, capability is the dependent variable. It is the product of decisions we make about the two co-independent variables in the equation, and they concern what we want to achieve, and how much we want to spend.

These two...