The Indo-Pakistan Summit: faltering steps towards peace? Sagarika Dutt comments on Indo-Pakistan relations in the light of the recent failed summit in Agra.

• Author: Dutt, Sagarika
• Position: Cover Story

Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September, and the US determination to bring Osama bin Laden to justice and destroy the al-Qaeda network which subsequently led to the American and British attacks on Afghanistan on 7 October, the politics of South Asia have assumed great importance in international relations. The problem in Afghanistan is an on-going one and at this juncture it is almost impossible to predict what will happen next. However, India and Pakistan are major nuclear powers in the region and their relations with each other are important in maintaining peace in the region, especially since religious sentiments play a role in their bilateral relations and in their relations with neighbouring countries such as Afghanistan.

Pakistan is now the only country in the world which has diplomatic relations with the Taliban and has been a `friend' of this pariah regime for many years. President Musharraf claims that the government of Pakistan had to accept the political realities on the ground. However, under US pressure they appear to have changed sides and are now extending their cooperation to the international coalition against terrorism. One of the reasons why they had to do this was to prevent India from benefiting from this situation. Pakistan has always tried to counter India's dominance in the region. This article takes us back to the summit meeting in July 2001 in order to identify the key issues in India-Pakistan relations and comment on the significance of this summit. It can not be termed a turning point in India-Pakistan relations, but it was a step forward.

On 14 July 2001 Musharraf arrived at Palam Airport (New Delhi) to attend the summit. He was accompanied by his wife Sehba and an 11-member delegation. This was Musharraf's first visit to India, his birthplace, which he had left more than fifty years ago. And he was not the only Pakistani who had never visited India, his or his parents' birthplace. Partition had erected an iron curtain, although Jinnah had never intended that to happen. He had said categorically: `Now that the division of India has been brought about by a solemn agreement between the two Dominions, we should bury the past and resolve that ... we shall remain friends.' (1)

At Haveli Neharavali in Daryaganj, Musharraf met and embraced his old nanny, Anaro, now eighty-five years old and gave her gifts. Musharraf and his wife then visited the samadhi (mausoleum) of Mahatma Gandhi at Rajghat. He is apparently the first Pakistani head of state to place a wreath at the samadhi. He wrote in the visitors' book: `Never has the requirement of his ideals [of peace and non-violence] been more severely felt than today, especially in the context of Pakistan-India relations.' (2)

Kashmir issue

However, it soon became apparent that the two countries were not on the same wave-length. At a banquet held in Musharraf's honour, the President of India, K.R. Narayanan, said: `We in India hold fast to the fundamentals of tolerance and secular democratic principles'. (3) These were the principles on which India and Pakistan could build a relationship of `genuine peace, friendship and co-operation'. Musharraf did not disagree with him, but his interpretation of how these principles should be applied in Indo-Pakistan relations was quite different from that of the Indian government. He brought up the issue of Kashmir, declaring that there could be no `military solution' to the dispute and that the two countries must break the `impasse of the past'.

It soon became clear that for Pakistan Kashmir was the core issue. Musharraf even had a meeting with the leaders of the All-Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), at which he promised `his full moral, diplomatic and political support to Kashmiris in their just struggle'. However, the Indian government was not too happy about this. It regards the Hurriyat as a `secessionist outfit'. This is at odds with Musharraf's perception of them as the voice of Kashmir.

Kashmir is the only state in India that has a Muslim majority. According to the two-nation theory (that the Hindus and the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent are two separate nations) propounded by the Muslim leaders, on the basis of which India was partitioned and India and Pakistan came into existence in 1947 as two separate sovereign states, Kashmir should have joined Pakistan. However, Kashmir was a princely state at that time ruled by a Hindu Maharaja, who toyed with the idea of remaining independent. On being invaded by tribesmen from Pakistan, he quickly signed the instrument of accession and joined the Indian Union. This led to the first war between India and Pakistan, in which India lost one-third of the territory of the state. Why India did not try to recapture the territory, given that its armed forces were superior to those of Pakistan, is a question that is sometimes asked. However, the Indian government refused to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir in accordance with UN resolutions as long as Pakistan continued to occupy the territory that it had seized. At any rate the Indian government has always rejected the two-nation theory, maintaining that India is a secular state and that Kashmir is an integral part of India. In other words, the instrument of accession cannot be nullified. The United States' view that the two countries should resolve the Kashmir issue `taking into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people' is good in principle but is problematic in practice as the Kashmiri people are constantly being manipulated by political leaders, groups and organisations. Also the conflict has displaced thousands of Hindu Kashmiris and their wishes also need to be considered, not just those of the Muslim population.

Summit diplomacy

Berridge argues that `summitry may sometimes be highly damaging to diplomacy and is always risky; and it may serve only foreign or domestic propaganda purposes. Nevertheless, judiciously employed and carefully prepared, it can -- and does -- serve diplomatic purposes as well'. (4) Summit...