Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan.

• Author: Steadman, Hugh
• Position: Book review

LOSING SMALL WARS: British military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Author: Frank Ledwidge

Published by: Yale University Press, New Haven, 2011, 308pp,

USS27.50.

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Ledwidge opens with potted histories of the Basra (Iraq) and Helmand (Afghanistan) campaigns. In Basra, after a copybook entry into the city using minimum force, the British Army, lacking local intelligence, any long-term plan and anything approaching sufficient boots on the ground, in effect handed over governance of the city to the predations of local criminal gangs. Unable to project power or security into the city, the British force withdrew into itself, prioritising its own protection (a 'self-licking lollipop') until finally relieved by US Marines and the new Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Army, having good local intelligence, was able to reinstate central government authority.

Having spectacularly failed in Basra, the British Army sought redemption in US eyes by taking on full responsibility for Helmand. Here again, the British had poor (or no) local intelligence and insufficient boots on the ground to be able to provide security to the local population. As a consequence of force insufficiency, they were reduced to using massive firepower at the cost of alienating the population.

These two campaigns provide the foundation of the main body of the book, which is devoted to an analysis of the failures and to suggestions as to possible reforms that could prevent future repeats.

Ledwidge, while pointing out that the overall responsibility lay with the British government's having no clearly stated goal (other than to impress the United States with the value of Britain as an ally), apportions the lion's share of responsibility for failure to the military leadership. Senior officers failed to stand up and speak truth to political power. Rather than insisting on adequate manning levels, the generals chose to say 'can do' when clearly they could not. Stretched beyond the limit in Basra, they then agreed to take on the even heavier commitment of Helmand.

Ledwidge argues that all three of Britain's armed forces have a hugely inflated cadre of senior officers, compared with the United States or israeli armed forces. He argues that too many generals with too few combat posts to fill not only wastes resources but also leads to dysfunctional competition.

Continuing with Cold War doctrine, the British made the initial error in Helmand of rotating whole brigades rather than...