Reformulating New Zealand's grand strategy: Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco suggests the need for an adjustment in this country's approach in order to manage risks and harvest opportunities.

AuthorAlonso-Trabanco, Jose Miguel

According to the classical geopolitical theories of Sir Halford Mackinder, New Zealand is located in the so-called 'outer crescent,' a peripheral zone far from the Eurasian 'heartland'. The vast distance that separates such an insular position from the world's centres of geopolitical gravity means that it can only be reached through formidable maritime capabilities. In fact, its contemporary condition as the remotest Commonwealth realm reflects the historical sea-faring orientation of Great Britain as an imperial hegemonic power in the 19th century. Moreover, the country's economic vitality--a matter of national security--has relied on access to international markets for both imports and exports, something only blue-water navies can guarantee. This explains the country's close geopolitical alignment with both London and Washington, even more so than the influence of socio-cultural common denominators shared by the nations of the Anglosphere.

Furthermore, the country's remoteness has shielded it from the direct fallout of major international conflicts. Nevertheless, this South Pacific state lacks the critical mass to shape the trajectory of global affairs in a decisive way.

* New Zealand's territory covers almost 268,000 square kilometres, an extent smaller than Italy's. (1)

* Its population (5 million people) is comparable to that of countries like Ireland (5.2 million) and Costa Rica (5.2 million). (2)

* Its GDP (more thanUS$249 billion) makes it the world's 41st largest economy, behind comparable states like Israel (US$527 billion) and Singapore (US$423 billion). (3)

On the other hand, New Zealand is a wealthy country with high living standards, thanks to its secure location, optimal natural conditions which favour agricultural productivity and the pivotal place of its harbours as gateways to reap the benefits of international trade. Its GDP per capita in 2022 (US$49,847) is higher than those of Italy ($41,900) and Japan ($40,000). (4) To a certain extent, this explains why Wellington has adopted an approach of relative 'benign neglect' when it comes to geopolitical affairs. After all, there is no need to get actively involved in the complex--and sometimes dangerous--games of high politics when essential needs are reasonably well-covered.

Changing environment

Nevertheless, New Zealand's strategic environment is changing because of a combination of on-going phenomena: rising military tensions in East Asia, the tectonic shockwaves unleashed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the vanishing utopian vision of an enduring 'rules-based order', a simmering strategic competition between the United States and China over global economic and technological superiority, regional maritime disputes, evolving geopolitical alignments in the Indo-Pacific region, the rogue behaviour of North Korea, the growing profile of India as a geopolitical heavyweight and Japan's strategic anxieties. Plus, as a result of Brexit--a process that is redefining trans-Atlantic relations --the United Kingdom and the United States are forging closer ties, which has implications for New Zealand's national interests. In short, a threshold of transition is on the horizon.

Wellington cannot afford to ignore these realities, which present both challenges and opportunities. Even though New Zealand's national power is not sufficient to alter the outcome in any meaningful fashion, it has to find a way to adapt, especially if it does not want to be caught in a disadvantageous position. After all, New Zealand has fiercely protected its independent streak, even when facing the might of stronger nations. For instance, it declined to join Australia in the late 19th century, it invaded German Samoa --a German protectorate in the South Pacific--when the First World War broke out and it banned the presence of American ships carrying nuclear weapons or nuclear powered in both its ports and territorial waters in the 1980s. Needless to say, the latter action--although of little military consequence--was an outspoken political and diplomatic statement of national sovereignty vis-a-vis the United States.

Right now, New Zealand can harness changing circumstances in a favourable way. For this purpose, it must be borne in mind that national states behave a lot like living organisms. If they do not adapt to their surroundings effectively, they will be left in a...

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