Things that go bang in the desert.

• Author: Dickens, David
• Position: India's nuclear tests - New Zealand Foreign Policy

David Dickens reviews the domestic and strategic basis of India's nuclear tests.

India's decision to test three nuclear devices at the Pokhran weapons range in the Rajasthan Desert on 11 May, and a further two two days later, took the world by surprise. Few governments, intelligence communities, and security analysts seem to have anticipated that India would test weapons so soon after the formation of a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition. Why did India test? To what extent did domestic or strategic considerations play a part?

Some media commentators insist that the tests were a nationalist statement, a bid for self-respect and power. Others have insisted that tests were motivated by the desire of the weak BJP coalition to strengthen its position domestically. Any attempt to explain the Indian government's decision should be tempered by an appreciation of how little is actually known about the decision-makers' motivations in approving the tests. Indeed, it is not clear at this stage who all the key policy-makers were on this issue. There is speculation in New Delhi that the decision was made by an inner group of Cabinet. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's senior political adviser Pramod Mahajan, and his Secretary Brajesh Mishra, also appear to have played leading advisory roles. The stances taken by the Prime Minister's Department, Foreign Ministry and chiefs of staff are still unclear.

The tests initially received near universal domestic political support in India. Since then voices of protest have emerged. BJP political rivals such as Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi have come out in support of the coalition government's decision to test. This suggests that domestic political calculations may have informed the BJP coalition's actions. Perhaps it sought to tap into domestic political support for testing that has been steadily rising in India since the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations.

The decision was consistent with BJP policy. The BJP had promised to test nuclear weapons in its election manifesto (although most commentators thought there would be a warning first). Evidence of this sort suggests that domestic factors almost certainly played an important part in the Indian decision to test. There is also evidence (in statements by the Minister of Defence and the Head of the Atomic Energy Commission) that the decision to test was not guided by domestic considerations alone. India's Defence Minister George Fernandes was reported on 20 March as saying that the decision of the new coalition government to `induct' nuclear weapons had been kept on hold. `We did not say that we are going in for nuclear weapons', Fernandes said. He added that a decision on the future place of atomic weapons would depend on a thorough strategic review to be undertaken by a revived National Security Council. While not ruling out the option of inducting weapons some time in the future, Fernandes's comments were widely interpreted by the Indian media as confirmation that testing would not precede in the short term. However some New Delhi observers now believe that the hardline Fernandes may not have been privy to the decision to test, and holds little influence in Cabinet.

Key order

Press comments by the Head of the Atomic Energy Commission, R. Chidambaram, indicate that the coalition government gave the order to test India's nuclear weapons on 11 April 1998. Chidambaram commented that the tests were motivated by technical considerations (relating to the nuclear deterrent). He also commented that the decision to test was given the day after Prime Minister Vajpayee announced the constitution of a task force to work out the function, role, and structure of the National Security Council `which the government desires to set up'.

Why then did the Indian government apparently change its mind on the...