Towards an all-hazards approach: Jim Rolfe discusses New Zealand's approach to security in the 21st century.

• Author: Rolfe, Jim
• Position: Essay

In early November 2014 Prime Minister John Key gave an address to the nation that was billed in advance as a major speech on 'New Zealand's National Security'. In the event, the speech focused on the threat to New Zealand of events in Iraq and Syria and the dangers presented by New Zealand based sympathisers of the so-called Islamic State. The speech also announced a range of measures to combat this security threat. By using the speech in this way, the prime minister singled out one (no doubt important) issue, but, on the assumption that he does not believe that New Zealand's security is solely tied up with the threat of Islamic terrorism, begged the question as to what New Zealand's security is all about. Clearly, there is more to New Zealand's security than threats from one version of international terrorism.

Until about 40 years ago it was possible to discuss New Zealand's national security in terms almost completely of threats from another country. The armed forces were responsible for countering the threats from foreign military enemies and thus for the 'defence of New Zealand', as the Defence Act 1990 phrased it. The more covert foreign enemies who exercised their skills through the arts of espionage, sabotage and subversion were the responsibility of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, supported by the Police if an arrest was considered necessary. Security in this context, defined in the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969, was 'the protection of New Zealand from acts of espionage, sabotage, and subversion, whether or not they are directed from or intended to be committed within New Zealand'. These definitions have been amended slightly and added to over the years, but from the legislative perspective the sense has remained more or less unchanged.

This was a world of certainty as to the nature of the threat, if not as to how best to counter it. Periodically, the Defence system would produce a white paper, outlining and explaining the policy for the use of the armed forces to counter threats from other armed forces. The more covert threats were rarely discussed, and the Security Intelligence Service's enabling legislation was not at all explicit as to the methods that would be used to counter those threats. It was a given that the threats existed and that the state should deal with them quietly.

Other events, floods, earthquakes, economic slump, were accepted as being important, even dangerous, indeed even as threats to national stability, but were not treated as 'security issues' and were the responsibility of the appropriate agency. In this system, agencies stuck to their knitting and worked with other agencies only when necessary, normally when responding to a specific event.

Changed discussion

From the mid-1970s in response to a changing and, many believed, more uncertain international environment (US defeat in Vietnam, the 1973 oil shocks) the discussion changed. The economy was recognised as a security issue and then issues such as energy and food reserves and national measures for coping with major earthquakes also began to be seen in the same light. Underlying this 'comprehensive security' approach was the idea that security was too important a concept to be considered only in military terms.

Despite the recognition that security should be considered comprehensively in concept, by and large the specific components were still treated discretely. Responses to identified security threats were still generally based on specific agencies with responsibilities for the specific areas.

New Zealand changed its approach to thinking about security formally in 1987 with the establishment of an 'Office of the Coordinator of Domestic and External Security'. The coordinator, a senior public servant, reported to the prime minister but operated outside formal departmental structures. The system, within which the coordinator was intended to act as the name implied, was to 'assist the orderly government of New Zealand in the face of any threat to the well-being of the nation'. (1) The principles to be followed in ensuring that New Zealand was secure included:

* the policy should be comprehensive;

* essential powers should be in place;

* there should be criteria for the allocation of resources to ensure security;

* there should be a small central co-ordinating structure;

* existing lines of authority and accountability should not be altered. (2)

In terms of the transition of thinking about security, the idea that not only should the concept be comprehensive but also so too should the responses was fundamental.

Possible threats to New Zealand's security were identified under headings such as: military; economic; terrorism, whether of external or internal origin; espionage, sabotage or subversion; threats to public order...