The weaponisation of space: justification and consequences: Bryan Dorn examines the United States' current approach to space-based weapons systems and warns of the likely adverse consequences.

• Author: Dorn, Bryan
• Position: Cover Story

During the Cold War the United States and Soviet Union both pursued an anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) capability. However the reliance upon satellites for command and control of nuclear forces meant the destruction of these satellites would render one's nuclear forces vulnerable to a first strike. This would increase crisis instability and encourage a pre-emptive nuclear strike. As a result, the development of ASAT weapons was deemed destabilising to the strategic nuclear equation. The Bush administration's missile defence system incorporates the deployment of missile interceptors in space. This has reactivated Cold War strategic anxieties that were previously extinguished by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. This article will assess the Bush administration's strategic justification for the weaponisation of space and determine the negative repercussions of its approach for arms control.

Despite the conclusion of the Cold War and reduction in offensive nuclear arsenals, Cold War strategic anxieties continue to dictate US, Russian and Chinese nuclear forces. Military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq indicate America's heavy reliance upon space-borne communication and military satellites to assist its terrestrial military forces. 'The Pentagon operates roughly five defense satellite communications system satellites, a similar number of defense support program satellites for early warning of ballistic-missile launch, three MILSTAR communication satellites, perhaps nine ultra-high frequency communication satellites, one polar military satellite, and a classified number of signals intelligence satellites'. (1) As a result, satellites have become an attractive target for hostile regional powers. Destruction of American satellites would severely affect its military forces, possibly increase US casualties and consequently raise the bargaining leverage of the regional power.

These strategic concerns have fuelled America's desire to weaponise space. The Rumsfeld Space Commission indicated that space was a significant national security priority. US space superiority was required to 'deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space', incorporating 'uses of space hostile to US interests'. (2) The reliance of the US military upon space-based assets for intelligence, communication, surveillance and weapons targeting has aroused fears that the United States could experience a 'Pearl Harbor in Space', essentially neutralising its military strength. This was deliberately phrased language designed to instil fear and alarm in the American public, consequently increasing support for US domination of space.

The release of the US Air Force publication for warfare in space, Counterspace Operations of 2 August 2004, detailed operations against space systems and satellites. This document articulates a clear US ambition to ensure 'space superiority'. It is stated: 'U.S. Air Force counterspace operations are the ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains space superiority. Space superiority provides freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack (AFDD 1) ... Space and air superiority are crucial first steps in any military operation'. (3) Leonard Weiss, Chairman of the Federation of American Scientists Panel on Weapons in Space, supported the argument that the weaponisation of space was designed to ensure US military dominance. Weiss stated: 'The proponents of weaponization have made it clear that ... they ... want those weapons in order to add to U.S. military dominance via the ability to attack, from another platform, the space assets of others, and in so doing, to add to our geopolitical clout'. (4) The Counterspace Operations document does not discredit the use of pre-emptive strikes to ensure US space dominance.

International law

The Rumsfeld Commission argued that there was no 'blanket prohibition in international law on placing or using weapons in space, applying force from space to earth or conducting military operations in and through space'. (5) International suspicion regarding US intentions in space was increased by Washington's reluctance to support the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). The planned...