Global Zero: the new old agenda: Ron Smith raises questions about the efficacy of efforts to abolish all nuclear weapons.

• Author: Smith, Ron

Would the world be a safer place without nuclear weapons? To many the answer is self-evident: of course it would. Nuclear weapons have the capacity to do enormous damage. This is indisputable. Should we then ban them (abolish them, eliminate them)? Again, to many (including 100 'world leaders' meeting in Paris) and President Obama, speaking in Prague, the answer is 'yes' and the matter one of urgency. Abolition has also been a long-term project of the New Zealand government in company with its 'New Agenda' partners. According to Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution, abolition is also favoured by a majority of former US Secretaries of State and Defense. (1)

But is it as simple as this? How feasible, or even desirable, is abolition at this time? There are well-rehearsed reasons to retain at least some of the world's nuclear arsenals on the grounds that, collectively, they contribute to global security, through the operation of deterrence. It also needs to be noted that, at the practical level, abolition is much more difficult (for both technical and political reasons) than its populist proponents acknowledge. Together, these persistent and profound reservations need to be taken seriously.

Abolition project

In the course of his widely-reported and rapturously received speech to the people of Prague, President Obama committed himself 'to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. (2) The President then went on to 'outline the trajectory we need to be on'. These trajectory steps included 'cuts in nuclear weapon stockpiles' and a 'reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy', a 'global ban on nuclear testing' (for which the US Congress would need to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and a fissile materials treaty. The Obama 'trajectory' would also entail strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and renewed efforts to 'ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon'. Of course, none of these trajectory specifics would amount to abolition but they are clearly intended to set the pre-conditions for a zero world.

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A similar project was announced by Global Zero at its formation in early December 2008, following a two-day meeting by '100 political, military, business, faith and civic leaders from across political lines'. (3) Again, 'deep reductions' in US and Russian arsenals are to be followed by a 'phased and verified' process, which takes nuclear arsenals to zero. Both Global Zero and President Obama envisage international control of the nuclear fuel cycle to prevent future development of nuclear weapons. Overall, it may be that the only difference between the two projects is that the President is very clear that the United States will not give up its weapons whilst others retain them.

Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee that defence to our allies.... (4) As noted, some of the projects envisaged in Paris and Prague (such as stockpile reductions and a test ban treaty) clearly fall short of 'Abolition', or 'Zero'. They will thus not be further discussed here. Something similar applies to many of the so-called '13 Steps' towards the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, although in this case nuclear disarmament is tied (as it is in the NPT Treaty) to the even more implausible requirement of 'general and complete disarmament under effective international control'. The main focus of what follows will be on reasons for retaining some portion of the world's nuclear arsenals (that is, the place of deterrence in global security), on the practical and political problems of verification, and on controlling the nuclear fuel cycle and preventing proliferation.

Deterrence elements

Nuclear deterrence has two distinct elements to it. At the most fundamental, it provides that a party possessing nuclear weapons will not use them against another party that is similarly armed for fear of unacceptable retaliation. This is sometimes called 'strict deterrence' and if this were all there was to it, it might seem that the problem of unacceptable destruction could be solved by all parties agreeing to give up their nuclear weapons: the 'global zero'.

But as global security has been structured since 1945, nuclear arsenals have functioned in another way. In the hands of major states they have meant that these states could not afford to risk serious conventional conflict (however deeply felt might be the issue between them) for fear that nuclear weapons would ultimately be used. This is 'extended deterrence' and it is this inhibition of conflict between the major states (the prevention of a Third World War) that would be lost in the event of nuclear abolition.

Extended deterrence does not guarantee against any nuclear weapon use. As President Obama noted in his Prague speech, there is the possibility that terrorists might get hold of sufficient material to make and...